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Matthew Restall’s When Montezuma met
Cortés delivers a blow to the basic
structure of all current histories of the
conquest of Mexico. Absolutely all
accounts, from Cortés’ second letter to
Charles V in 1520 to Inga Clendinnen’s
 masterful 1991 article “’Fierce and
Unnatural Cruelty,’”[1] assume that the
conquest of Mexico was led by Hernán
Cortés, who is described by Wikipedia as
a “Spanish Conquistador who led an
expedition that caused the fall of the Aztec Empire and brought large portions of what is
now mainland Mexico under the rule of the King of Castile.” These accounts represent
Cortés as willingly deciding to enter Tenochtitlan in the hopes of capturing Montezuma,
the Aztec Emperor, expecting to rule Mexico via a proxy ruler, and seeing himself as
Julius Cesar in Gaul. Although Clendinnen shows that there was no Machiavellian logic
in any of this Cortesian strategy, she keeps the trope of Cortés as the central protagonist
of a tragic-comedy.
Montezuma’s reasoning for allowing Cortés and his 250 surviving conquistadors to
enter Tenochtitlan is, after Cortés’s overblown heroics, the second leg of all histories of
the conquest. Montezuma’s actions have been cast as a surrender to prophecy, implying
imperium translatio (willingly bestowing sovereignty upon superior returning deities),
idiotic cowardice, or simply unfathomable, unintelligible reaction. Either way,
Montezuma always comes across as a diminished ruler, even a puppet. Cortés captured,
imprisoned, killed, and desecrated Montezuma’s remains.
The third leg of the stool organizing narratives of the conquest of Mexico is the brutality
of Aztec rule and the extent of the Aztec practice of human sacri ce. The alleged
industrialization of Aztec ritual sacri ce has allowed some traditional accounts to justify
the conquest.
Restall knocks down all three legs. He demonstrates that the numbers of sacri ced
captives that are thrown around make absolutely no sense. The proposed numbers do
not match basic arithmetic, demography, or the archeological  ndings at templo mayor,
where the sacri ces were supposed to have taken place.
The leg that sustains Cortés as protagonist tumbles down just as easily. Restall
demonstrates that Cortés was a mediocrity before landing in Yucatan and after the
conquest.  Cortés arrived in Hispaniola in 1504 and participated in the conquest of Cuba
in 1511, playing the role of follower not leader throughout. After Tenochtitlan, Cortés led
the conquest of Honduras and California where his incompetence shined through, not
his greatness.  Restall  shows that leaders of the many Spanish factions, namely, the
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Finally, the leg in the stool that portrays Montezuma as fool, is demolished by Restall in
showing that Montezuma made fools of  Cortés and his captains. He led them down  a
path that would secure attrition and observation. The envoys of Montezuma in Yucatan
encouraged a path to Tenochtitlan via an enemy route. Cortés and his captains
encountered  rst the Totonec and then the Tlaxcalan, before crossing the mountains to
get to the valley that nestled Tenochtitlan in the middle.  Restall demonstrates that when
the weakened conquistadors stopped  ghting with the Tlaxcalan, it was the latter,, not
Cortes, who chose the path to get to the Aztec capital to visit Montezuma, including a
 detour to the city of Cholula.
This detour has always puzzled historians because it was out of the way and because
the “conquistadors” staged a massacre of Cholulan lords for no apparent reason
whatsoever. In his letters to Charles V, Cortés sought to explain the massacre as
preventive violence to clamp down on the simmering rise of treasonous behavior among
allies. Restall shows, however, that the massacre was a Tlaxcalan initiative and that the
Spaniards had no role in its planning.. Tlaxcalan elites massacred the Cholulan for
having recently broken the Tlaxcala Triple Alliance (that also included Huejotzingo) in
order to embrace the Aztec. Even in their massacres, Cortés and his captains were
puppets.
A 17th century CE oil painting depicting the meeting of Spanish Conquistador Hernan Cortes and Aztec ruler
Montezuma (Motecuhzoma II) in 1519 CE (via Ancient History Encyclopedia)
Restall dwells on Montezuma’s zoos and collections to provide an answer to another
puzzling decision of Cortés and his captains: they disassembled their  eet in Veracruz
and crossed Central Mexico to dwell in Tenochtitlan for nine months. What would 250
badly injured and poorly provisioned conquistadors expect? To rule an empire of millions
from the capital by holding the emperor hostage? Ever since Cortés penned his letters to
Charles V, chroniclers and historians, (including indigenous ones trained by the
Franciscans who wrote accounts of the conquest in the 1550s for the great multi-
volume encyclopedia of Aztec lore, the Florentine Codex) have accepted this as a
plausible strategy, even a brilliant Machiavellian one that took Montezuma unaware.
   Restall, however, proves that the Spaniards remained nine months walled in
Montezuma’s palaces near the monarch’s zoo and gardens.
Restall proves that Montezuma’s majesty resided in his collection: zoos, gardens, and
pharmacopeias. Montezuma collected women, wolves, and dwarfs. He led Cortés and
his bosses to Tenochtitlan to add the pale Spaniards to his menageries and palaces. The
Spanish factions had no choice. Montezuma was no one’s puppet. He used the
Spaniards as curiosities to reinforce his majesty and power. Montezuma was no one’s
prisoner; he was murdered. His body never desecrated by his own people. After the
murder, the Spaniards were slaughtered and the few survivors  ed the capital in the
middle of the night, humiliated and beaten. The historiography has called the night when
the Aztecs routed the Spaniards the Noche Triste.
Cortés and his surviving captains reassembled after the rout in Tlaxcala, from where
they allegedly led a year long assault on Tenochtitlan. Restall shows that this protracted,
  nal battle over the capital and the surrounding towns was not a campaign Cortés;
captains controlled, any more than they controlled the  rst visit to Tenochtitlan. The  nal
siege of Tenochtitlan was a war among noble Nahua factions as well as the reshu ing
of altepetl (Nahua city) alliances. Elite families of Texcoco realigned to create a new
alliance with Tlaxcala.
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Restall introduces a new category to replace conquest: war.  He equates the violence
unleashed by the arrival of conquistadors with the violence of the two World Wars in the
twentieth century. There was untold suffering and civilian casualties, systematic cruelty
by ordinary people, rape and sexual exploitation as tools of warfare.
He is right. Yet this shift, paradoxically, infantilizes the natives and concedes all agency,
again, to Europeans. In the political economy of malice, Spaniards had no monopoly.
Restall demonstrates that Tlaxcalan and Texcocan lords led the massive massacres in
Cholula and Texcoco. It is clear, also, that lords used the war to transact women like
cattle and to  amplify the well-entrenched Mesoamerican system of captivity and
slavery. Why then does Restall concede to the Spaniards all the monopoly of cruelty?
War made monsters not just out of ordinary vecinos from Extremadura and Andalucia.
War also made monsters of plenty of local lords.
 
[1]  Inga Clendinnen “Fierce and Unnatural Cruelty”: Cortés and the Conquest of Mexico,
Representations 33 (1991): 65-100
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